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Abstract: A reform is underway in Kenya, aimed at transforming the police organization into a people-
centred police service. Among other things, this involves enhancing police-public trust and partnerships
through community policing (COP). Two state-initiated COP models have been implemented: the National
Police Service’s Community Policing Structure, and the Nyumba Kumi model of the President’s Office. On
paper, police reform and the two COP models would appear to have the potential to improve police-public
cooperation. In practice, however, implementation has proven difficult. Interviews and meetings with local
community organizations, community representatives and police officers in urban and rural parts of Kenya
indicate that scepticism towards the two COP models is common, as is refusal to engage in them. But why
is this so? Why are these two COP models unsuccessful in enhancing police-public trust and cooperation?
This article analyses how various contextual factors—such as conflicting socio-economic and political
interests at the community and national levels, institutional challenges within the police, the overall role and
mandate of the police in Kenya, and a top-down approach to COP—impede the intended police paradigm
shift.
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1. Introduction and Context
The police are highly dependent on collaboration and in-
formation from citizens in order to provide and maintain
security within a state. ‘Without at least partial collaboration
of citizens, police work is impossible’ ([1], p. 23). If the
police do not have the support of the public, core police
tasks such as investigation, evidence gathering and preven-
tion become more difficult. However, effective cooperation
between the police and the public requires that the police
enjoy a certain minimum level of trust among the population
[2]. In Kenya, public trust and confidence in the police is
generally low [3–6], for various reasons. Firstly, in many
African states, the police forces were developed in order
to secure European colonial regimes by coercive means
([1], p. 21). Much has changed since independence, but
traces of the colonial and post-colonial state are still evident
in many African police systems today, as the nature and
purpose of policing have remained the same ([7], p. 69).
The Kenyan police system was established by and for the
British colonialists, mainly to protect colonial interests [4,8].
After Kenyan independence in 1963, the mandate of the
police remained largely unchanged: to secure the interests
of those in power [4,9,10]. A second factor that contributes
to lack of trust in the police is the widespread practice
of individual police officers taking advantage of their posi-
tion for personal gain. Public opinion polls rank the police
the most corrupt state institution in the country [9,11,12].
Moreover, out of 180 countries, Kenya was number 144
on Transparency International’s corruption perception in-
dex for 2018 [13]. Many members of the public see the
police as a hazard, not a protecting force or a service to
the population. In a study conducted in ten urban and rural
communities in Kenya in 2011, the police were identified
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as a major source of insecurity [14]. Another report, based
on data collected from 500 households among urban poor
in South Eastleigh in Nairobi in 2015, found that 26% of
the violence experienced by these households had been
carried out by the police [15]. Further, some crimes are
also directly or indirectly attributed to the police [4]—with
police officers contributing to crime rather to its prevention
and detection [3]. The post-election violence in 2007 and
2017 also affected police-public relations. The violence in
the wake of the 2017 national elections were particularly
bloody; according to the official inquiry: ‘the Kenyan police
conducted themselves unprofessionally, used excessive
force, and were woefully ineffective in protecting life and
property’ ([16], p. 11).
In addition to high levels of crime and violence in general,
Kenya is struggling to counter violent extremism. In particu-
lar, the Somali jihadi group al-Shabaab regularly carries out
terrorist attacks in Kenya, and several Kenyans have been
recruited to al-Shabaab [17]. As is the case also in other
countries, the Kenyan state has responded to terrorism with
top-down, militarized measures. This harsh anti-terrorism
line has damaged police-public relations even further [18].
The measures employed by the state have been heavily
criticized: the police have been accused of extrajudicial
killings, disappearances, harassment, ill treatment and un-
lawful detentions—as well as misusing the anti-terror law to
collect bribes and loot houses [19–24]
The Kenyan police system has long been character-
ized by crime control through reactive policing practices,
widely condemned by Kenyan society [4,25]. The reform
currently underway seeks to address this by improving
police-public relations through initiatives such as commu-
nity policing (COP)—a concept which has become popu-
lar among donors, governments, police and policymakers
worldwide. ‘So popular is the concept with politicians, city
managers, and the general public, that few police chiefs
want to be caught without some program they can call com-
munity policing’ ([26], p. 27). However, COP as such is
vague, interpreted and practised differently, with no consen-
sus on what it entails [27]. Despite the many COP projects
initiated around the world, agreed definitions of what com-
munity policing is and what it is not do not exist [28]. The
concept is ‘bedevilled by definitional problems’ ([29], p. 167)
and ‘can be transformed chameleon-like into whatever its
practitioners want it to be’ ([30], p. 71). On the one hand
it can be used as a tool for the state to gather intelligence
to protect itself from its own population and for elites to
maintain their power. On the other hand, COP can serve
as a way for the police to improve relations with the public
so as to provide better services, security and safety for
and with the populace. The latter understanding of COP is
dominant in the academic literature today. In practice, how-
ever, approaches and implementation vary widely. Some
COP models aim for better effectiveness in terms of qual-
ity, responsiveness and accountability for police services;
others focus on greater engagement with local communi-
ties for community-based solutions to local challenges ([27],
p. 4). Each model comes with its own set of activities, goals,
expectations [27], with differing content, impact and chal-
lenges as to implementation. Although COP is primarily a
Western concept, it is increasingly implemented in countries
of the Global South—often encouraged by international ac-
tors mostly from the Global North [29]. Despite the positive
perceptions of COP, there is little evidence of its actual im-
pact and effectiveness, especially as regards its export to
non-Western societies [29]. This is reflected in the litera-
ture: empirically based studies of COP approaches and
police-public relations tend to focus on Western contexts
[27,31–34]. There is a clear need for better understanding
of the practices and meanings of COP across a broader
range of contexts.
Policing in Africa is still understudied and ‘ethnographic
work on public police bureaucracies in Africa is just be-
ginning’ ([35], p. 1). This article seeks to contribute to
the literature on policing in Africa as well as the evolving
debates on the role of COP in enhancing police-public re-
lations. In Kenya, two state-initiated COP initiatives for
improving police-public relations have been developed: the
National Police Service’ ‘Community Policing Structure’ and
the ‘Nyumba Kumi’ model led by the President’s Office.
However, moving from policy to practice has proven difficult.
Why have these two COP models proven unsuccessful? To
answer this, empirical material was gathered during field-
trips to urban areas in Nairobi and Mombasa, and rural
areas in Kisumu and Siaya counties between January 2016
and May 2018. These areas were selected in order to
capture experiences across urban and rural settings as
well as regions—Eastern, Mid- and Western Kenya—with
different local contexts. The findings cannot claim to be rep-
resentative of the implementation of the two COP models
throughout the whole country. Kenya is vast and diverse
entity, each county and sub-county having its own charac-
teristics in terms of demographics, culture, livelihood, crime
and political alliances. However, the study has identified
some major structural obstacles to proper implementation,
closely linked to overall national and programme-related
challenges not solely dependent on local conditions.
A total of 35 individual and group interviews were con-
ducted with representatives from community-based organi-
zations (CBOs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
and community members in Mombasa town and in the
Majengo and Eastleigh areas of Nairobi. These included
representatives from women’s, youth, human rights and
religious organizations, and members of the two COP fo-
rums. To gain insights and experiences from rural areas,
observation was conducted in COP sensitization meetings
held by the Directorate of Community Policing, Gender and
Child Protection for local communities and police in seven
villages in Kisumu and Siaya counties. In order to capture
police perspectives and experiences, individual and group
interviews were conducted with sixteen police officers sta-
tioned in Mombasa, Nairobi, Kisumu, Siaya, Garissa and
Nakuru counties. Some of these were individual interviews;
some participated in a group interview held in connection
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with a police training in Nairobi. Due to the sensitivity of the
topic, and the possible implications of interviewee claims
and statements, given the current security context, individ-
uals and organizations who have contributed to the study
have been anonymized.
2. Police Reform and Community Policing in Kenya
Despite some positive developments occurring within the
police system the last decades, the need to establish bet-
ter police-public relations and trust in Kenya is still dire.
Work on the current police reform began in the early 2000s,
and has now become the country’s largest and most com-
plex public-sector restructuring attempt since independence
from Britain in 1963 ([6], p. 2). The post-election violence
in 2007 pushed the police reform higher up on the agenda,
and the National Task Force on Police Reforms was estab-
lished. The Task Force produced a report, ‘the Ransley
Report’, with a roadmap for the reform [36,37]. The follow-
ing years brought about several structural changes within
the police. In connection with the redrafting of the 2010 Con-
stitution, the Kenya Police Service and the Administration
Police Service were joined together under one umbrella; the
National Police Service (NPS). The NPS Commission and
other oversight bodies such as the Internal Affairs Unit (IAU)
and the Independent Policing Oversight Authority (IPOA)
were also established. In 2015, when Joseph Boinett was
sworn in as new Inspector General (IG) of the NPS, he
stated that his goal was a people-centred police [38], adding
that the aim of the reformation process was to ‘transform
the Kenya police and administration police into efficient ef-
fective and professional and accountable security agencies
that Kenyans can trust for their safety and security’ [39].
The establishment of the NPS represented a strategic shift
towards a more service-oriented institution; among its main
functions is to ‘foster and promote relationships with the
broader society’ [40]. Today the mission of the NPS is, ac-
cording to its website, ‘To provide professional and people
centred police service through community partnership and
upholding rule of law for a safe and secure society’ [41].
Clearly, enhancing police-public relationships and trust are
central to Kenya’s current police reform, and community
policing is to play a vital role.
The NPS defines COP as follows:
Community Policing is the approach to policing that recog-
nizes voluntary participation of the local community in the
maintenance of peace and which acknowledges that the
police need to be responsive to the communities and their
needs, its key element being joint problem identification
and problem-solving, while respecting the different respon-
sibilities the police and the public have in the field of crime
prevention and maintaining order ([25], p. 1).
By using this definition, NPS has chosen to focus es-
pecially on the ‘soft’ aspects of policing, such as police
responses to community needs, and collaborative problem-
identification and problem-solving. It also highlights that
both the public and the police play a role in crime preven-
tion and maintaining peace and order—in line with the vision
of moving from a police-centric to a more people-centric
police.
COP is not a new concept in Kenya. Several state and
non-state actors have introduced various types of COP
programmes aimed at bringing the police and the popu-
lace closer together [4,42]. Today, the most widely known
COP initiatives in Kenya are the two above-mentioned state-
initiated COP models: the NPS Community Policing Struc-
ture, and the Nyumba Kumi model led by the President’s
Office. COP was originally launched by former President
Mwai Kibaki in 2005, but the concept did not catch on at the
time [25]. In connection with the redrafting of the Constitu-
tion in 2010 and the shift from police force to police service,
the concept of COP was revived. Today, the function and
objectives of COP are emphasized and grounded in central
documents such as the National Police Service Act [43] and
the National Police Service Standing Orders [44].
2.1. Community Policing Committees
The NPS COP model is structured through Community
Policing Committees (CPC), from sub-locations to county
level under the County Policing Authority (CPA). These
committees consist of civilians and police who are to meet
and report up to the next level/committee in the chain [25].
The chairperson of the CPCs is a civilian; the vice-chair is
a member of the police [25]. According to the NPS COP
guidelines, membership in CPCs is to be on voluntary basis,
with no reimbursement for participation. Civilian members
can participate in a CPC for two years, with one renewal
possible [25]. The idea behind the committees is for indi-
viduals representing different segments of the community
(youth/children, women/men, schools, business community,
religious groups, etc.) and the police to meet regularly, in
order to identify and solve problems at the community level
and coordinate activities, programmes and trainings to pro-
mote security. The main pillars of the NPS COP are problem
solving, partnership and police transformation [25]. Further,
problem solving entails a ‘joint process of addressing recur-
ring security problems within a community’; ‘partnership’ is
defined as a collaborative effort with the primary objective
of determining security needs and policing priorities; and
‘police transformation’ refers to ‘a fundamental shift from
police-centric to people-centric policing’ ([25], pp. 10–11).
2.2. Nyumba Kumi
After the al-Shabaab attack on Westgate shopping mall in
Nairobi in 2013, President Uhuru Kenyatta introduced a
COP model called Nyumba Kumi (NK). Similar models are
found in several other African countries, including Tanzania,
Rwanda, Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo,
with varying results [45–48]. In Kenya, the NK model was
introduced as a strategy for fighting terrorism and insecurity
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by improving communication and cooperation between
communities and their police [49]. Nyumba Kumi translates
as ‘ten households’: however, in Kenya it is not limited to
a fixed number of households, but represents a cluster
of people and organizations with shared aspirations and
locality [50]. According to the guidelines for implementation:
Nyumba Kumi is a strategy of anchoring community policing
at the household level or any other generic cluster. These
households can be in a residential court, in an estate, a
block of houses, a manyatta, a street, a market centre, a
gated community, a village or a bulla. The concept is aimed
at bringing Kenyans together in clusters defined by physical
locations, felt needs and pursuit of common ideals: a safe,
sustainable and prosperous neighbourhood ([50], p. 3).
The aim is for local residents to get to know each other
better and to have a structure for communication among
themselves as well as with the local police. Local commu-
nity chiefs (civilians) lead the clusters and report to the local
police on matters of community security—the police are
not to formally be members of these clusters. According
to the NK implementation guidelines, members are to be
democratically elected for a two-year period and are eligible
for re-election [50]. As with the CPC, participation in NK
cluster is to be voluntary and the members not reimbursed.
NKs are not formally part of the NPS structure, but lie under
the auspices of the President’s Office.
The existence of two COP models implemented by dif-
ferent actors at the same time has created some confusion
and tension as the two models are partly conflicting [51].
Efforts are underway to merge the two concepts and place
NK clusters under sub-locations in the NPS COP structure,
to give COP a grounding at the household level ([25], p. 32).
3. Local Experiences and Perceptions of NK and
CPCs
Kenyans have long been calling for greater inclusion of local
communities in security strategies and improved coopera-
tion between police and communities [24,52]. As stated by
one NGO representative interviewed: ‘The police need to
work with the communities to be effective in security. Secu-
rity must be owned and driven by the community. Without
the community it will never succeed.’ He further emphasized
the need for an approach where various segments of the
police and community members can come together to dis-
cuss the challenges facing communities, and together find
out how to tackle them. He believed that such a problem-
solving approach could be one way of bringing the police
and the community closer together, or at least a way for the
local police to get more accurate information about what
was going on in the area. Further, it would make the police
more accountable to the communities. Another NGO repre-
sentative noted that many people were willing to cooperate
with the state in, for example, anti-terrorism strategies, but
‘what we are lacking is the how and the style’.
These views are in line with the stated aim of the CPCs
and NK policies: to create a platform where communities
and police work together to improve local security. However,
many Kenyans are sceptical towards the two initiatives. A
local resident in an urban area said he had been invited to
become a NK member but had refused; he added that he
did not believe in the NPS CPC model either. One member
of a team that organized communities meetings to raise
awareness and conduct trainings on the NK structure found
the job difficult: ‘People refused to come to the meetings.
Even the (already established) Nyumba Kumi members
didn’t turn up’. Why is it, that despite voicing the need for
community-friendly policing strategies, many citizens are
sceptical and reluctant to engage in the two state-initiated
COP models?
One explanation may be that the two COP models have
not been properly grounded locally. There has been little
training or follow-up with the communities, their leaders and
the local police on the aim, function, objective and structure
of CPCs and NK clusters. A study by the Kenyan NGO
MUHURI on youth radicalization in coastal regions found
that NK was well received in some coastal communities,
but ‘some respondents claimed that the initiative is not well
understood by the community. For it to work there must be
proper sensitization about it’ ([24], p. 22). And a study of
NK in Kayole in Nairobi concluded: ‘Due to lack of proper
structures and guidelines on the Nyumba Kumi, there is a
lot of confusion regarding the membership, roles and re-
sponsibility of the community.’ Several interviews and my
own observation of COP sensitization meetings showed
that CPCs and NK clusters had been established without
proper introduction to the set-up, the aims and purpose of
COP. There was misunderstanding and confusion, among
civilians as well as police, concerning the criteria and pro-
cess of selecting members, what membership entails, how
to organize the COP structures, and the main principles
behind the CPC and NK. The guidelines and written policies
on CPC and the NK model were either not made available
or were not followed at the local level. In another study of
NK in Nakuru county, the majority of the respondents an-
swered that they did not have the information on the policy
meant to guide the NK model [53].
In response to this problem, the Directorate of Commu-
nity Policing, Gender and Child Protection began holding
sensitization meetings and trainings on the CPC structure
with communities and local police in local communities. The
Police Reform Working Group in Independent Medico Legal
Unit (IMLU), a Kenyan NGO working to deepen people’s
understanding of police reform, also conducts sensitization
trainings on the CPC structure in some areas. One intervie-
wee had conducted trainings on the NK structure in some
areas in Nairobi. However, these efforts are small-scale,
backed with few resources. Moreover, there is little or no
monitoring or evaluation of the implementation of the two
structures. In addition, local stakeholders and communities
seemed to have had little influence in the development of
the structures. As a result, many people see COP as a
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matter of top-down models imposed on them by a state
apparatus they do not always trust.
Nyumba Kumi came about two years ago. They created
a new structure which was very foreign to people. (...)
It should be a community-driven initiative, owned by the
communities. It also needs to be based on the need of the
community, on community demand [54].
Lack of proper implementation, misunderstandings and
confusion may lead to unfortunate practices and misuse
of the COP models. In 2017, the NPS published the Com-
munity Policing Information Booklet, aimed at informing the
public and police officers about the CPC structure and clear-
ing up some of the misunderstandings as to the purpose
and aim of COP. The booklet emphasizes that COP should
not be identified with vigilantism, coercion or extortion, as
a replacement for village elders, or as spy rings, a parallel
security system, political forums, employment or other activ-
ities that contravene the law ([25], pp. 14–16)—all of these
being problems that had arisen in several places.
A common view in the areas visited for this study, in
relation to the CPCs as well as NK, is that COP serves
primarily as methods of surveillance and intelligence gath-
ering for the state and the police. Many people consider
those actively involved in the COP models to be police
informants—a role with definite negative connotations in
Kenya. A CBO representative put it this way: ‘When you
are a Nyumba Kumi member you are a spy. They (the com-
munity) call it a spy for the government’. An NK member
found that people in her community were sceptical of her
participation in the cluster. ‘The community sees you as
a snitch’ (...). People think you are a police informant’. A
police officer further explained: ‘Here, being an informant
is despised. (...) People working with the police are seen
as un-socialized’. One NK member explained that if people
see you reporting to the police, ‘it spoils the relationship
between you and your community’. That COP initiatives
are seen as systems for the state and the police to conduct
surveillance is a clear indication of the widespread mistrust
and gap between the state and the public. Many people
have negative experiences from previous encounters with
the state, with the police in particular. Here it is impor-
tant to note that the end of the reporting line for NK is
the President’s Office; in the NPS CPC structure, it is the
Police IG. Indeed, in practice the two COP initiatives may
serve as a means of gathering intelligence for the police
and the state; moreover, the focus on communities and
police identifying and solving problems together seems
less emphasised during implementation. The NK trainer
interviewed acknowledged that cluster members do not
necessarily know if and what actions are taken after the
meetings. ‘The problem with Nyumba Kumi is that you don’t
know if something will be done with issues, whether there is
a follow-up. The purpose is (only) to notify’. How the police
understand, treat and use the information emerging from
the COP forums is then of great importance for police-public
trust. At the community level, many people are generally
unwilling to provide information to the police, fearing that
police officers may violate the principle of confidentiality.
Several interviewees mentioned instances where police
officers had leaked information; moreover, this issue was
taken up by community members in almost all seven COP
sensitization meetings observed in connection with this
study. For example, in return for bribes, police officers have
revealed the identity of individuals who reported cases,
putting these persons at risk of retaliation and reprisals
from the perpetrators or others with a stake in the case.
One NK member said there had been incidents where:
people who share information are at risk of being targeted.
There is no confidentiality. The people who make a com-
plaint, for example regarding criminals, might end up having
descriptions of themselves given out and being targeted.
A survey conducted in Nairobi and Kisumu counties
by Transparency International Kenya in 2015–2016 found
that nine out of ten respondents answered that they did
not proactively share information with the police about an
issue or a concern in their community ([52], p. 45). Group
discussions conducted in the same study revealed that
respondents were reluctant to share vital information with
the police due to instances where information had been
relayed back to the culprits, to the detriment of the informant
[52]. When individual police officers violate the principle of
confidentiality, that naturally has an impact on police-public
trust, in turn negatively affecting the implementation of
COP efforts. Further, filing complaints against the police,
or advocating for police accountability in COP forums, may
prove equally risky.
You are surrounded by people who can kill you the next
minute. (...) You aren’t allowed to say anything against the
police. They are ‘little gods’. So that is not an area where
you can complain. If you do complain, they circulate your
details, and things get risky for you [55].
Low confidentiality means a weak foundation for build-
ing partnerships. Due to negative views about individuals
engaging in COP forums, local COP members risk accu-
sations and retaliations from their own communities. Confi-
dentiality breaches by police officers, as well civilian COP
members, make the security situation even more difficult for
COP members. An NK member explained that it is hard to
recruit members to the clusters, because volunteers cannot
be expected to put their lives at risk. At a sensitization
meeting in one village, insecurity for COP members was
identified as a main problem; and the CPC members them-
selves stressed the need for stronger security apparatus
and measures around them. However, if the COP forums
were less focused on intelligence gathering and providing
information on specific criminal cases, and more steered
towards collectively mapping and creating local solutions to
overall insecurities in the communities, being part of a COP
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structure would not entail the same degree of risk.
Another factor identified during the fieldwork was that
civilians were misusing their COP membership to increase
or maintain their own power. As mentioned, there were mis-
understanding and confusion at the local level concerning
structural and organizational aspects of the implementation
of the two models. This created opportunities for misuse,
not only for the police, but also for civilian members as well
as community leaders. Nepotism and tribalism are com-
mon in many societal, economic and political processes in
Kenya, and came into to play in the selection of COP forum
members. According to NK policies, cluster members are to
be democratically elected in biannual elections ([50], pp. 10–
11). And the CPC guidelines specifically state that members
are to represent different segments and groups in the com-
munity. However, in several case areas, the local COP
members were appointed by the community chief, rather
than the community electing their own representatives. A
community member raised this issue in a sensitization meet-
ing, saying that CPC members had been ‘selected through
nepotism’. Several interviewees in another area claimed
that the local chief had appointed the local NK members,
all of whom were people in his inner circle. This supports
the findings from a study in Nakuru, where more than half
of the respondents answered that democracy in electing
NK-initiative leaders was low or very low [53].
Moreover, a former NK member interviewed for this
study said that the chief used the NK structure to promote
his own agenda: ‘issues get pressure whenever the chief is
willing to give them pressure’. He described the NK meet-
ings as merely playing to the gallery; further, that the chief
would bribe members to report that the cluster was working
well and that it had reduced the level of crime in that area.
These are examples of how political or personal agen-
das overshadow the pillars of community partnerships and
a collective approach to problem identification and solving.
As many community members are in no position to hold
local powerholders and leaders of COP forums accountable,
and there are no proper oversight mechanisms for the two
COP structures, local powerholders can appoint members,
organize and run the COP forums according to their own
personal agendas—which are not necessarily in the interest
of the community as a whole. Another study of NK in Kayala,
in Nairobi county, also showed that NK was seen as a way
for village elders and leaders to promote their own interests
rather than those of the community, and that the lack of ef-
fective accountability channels made it easier for people to
take advantage of the system [56]. In several areas, there
were also reports of civilian CPC and NK members misus-
ing the COP models to distort, harass and ‘police’—even
to legitimize ‘arrests’—of other local residents. When this
was mentioned in COP sensitization meetings observed in
connection with this study, the trainer from the Directorate
of Community Policing explained to the COP members and
the police that only the police have the authority to make
arrests, and discouraged civilian members from engaging
in such practices, which could also entail considerable risks
to personal security. In the early phases of CPC and NK
implementation, civilian members were provided with COP
identity cards for documentation. However, these were
misused to legitimatize patrols, arrests and harassment of
co-citizens, therefore such ID cards are no longer issued.
4. In-house Challenges in NPS
In addition to breaches of confidentiality, interviewees iden-
tified several other in-house problems that had a negative
impact on police-public relations. Factors like working con-
ditions, resources and training of Kenyan police officers
hinder the implementation of the police reform and the two
COP models. The public often evaluate the police forces
in terms of their response time and effectiveness, and this
influences both relations and trust ([33], p. 66). In Kenya,
as elsewhere, it is hard for the police to meet all the expec-
tations of the public. For instance, in one rural village, local
police officers explained that they did not have a functional
vehicle at their disposal. They were often dependent on the
public to pay for their transport fares involved in conducting
their work. In another village, the local police officers com-
plained that they had to pay for transport out of their own
pockets. Other police stations were unable to pay for fuel
[52]. In Kenya, many police stations, police posts and patrol
bases lack the equipment and resources needed to be able
to fulfil their duties properly.
The working and living conditions of Kenyan police of-
ficers are generally harsh. Although the state provides
housing, availability is a challenge. Often, several officers
and their families must live together in cramped spaces
in housing of low standard [52]. Many police stations are
poorly equipped and in bad shape. ICT usage is low; the
station events log for registration of cases is a physical book,
not yet a digitalized system. Effectiveness is also affected
by the low density of police officers, who work long hours
[52]. Recent years have seen an upscaling in the recruit-
ment of new police officers in Kenya in order to meet the UN
police-civilian ratio of 1:450 [57]; however, the actual num-
ber of officers working at local police stations varies from
area to area. During one of the COP sensitization meet-
ings, local police officers claimed that they were altogether
only 26 police officers, from both Kenya Police Service and
Administration Police Service, serving a population of 500
000. In 2012, the Usalama Reforms Forum published the
report ‘Communities and their Police Stations’, which stud-
ied 21 police stations across Kenya. The report revealed
large variation in standards in terms of facilities, equipment,
organizational structure and staff among the police stations,
police posts and patrol bases. It recommended that the
government review all police stations, in order to determine
whether they were fit for their purpose, and to ensure com-
pliance with the minimum standards required to perform
their core functions [58].
Lack of proper training of police officers is another issue.
In 2014, basic police training in Kenya was cut from 15
to 9 months, and the concept of community policing has
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not been properly integrated into this training. A central
element in mainstreaming police reforms involves reviewing
and updating the police curriculum and training. An NGO
representative spoke in favour of police training in ‘how to
connect with communities and how to build trust with the
communities’. Further, a police officer emphasised that the
basic training curriculum is outdated: ‘The training is still
based on the colonial model of training. The training was
and still is to protect the ruling class’. Bringing the police
training and curriculum in line with the police reform is an
essential step towards ensuring a better understanding of
what people-centred policing entails and how policies and
models, including community policing, can be translated
into everyday police practices and methods.
However, the gap between what is taught at police
colleges, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, existing
police culture and practices on the ground may also prove
a challenge. Longstanding internal ‘unofficial rules’ that
police officers follow in the field is not necessarily in line
with the police training. Training on good practices may
have little effect in changing police behaviour unless fol-
lowed up by the leadership in police districts, or if it conflicts
with other incentives such as possibilities for promotions
[59]. Another issue is the gap between senior and junior
officers. Some police officers interviewed explained that the
younger officers often have a higher level of general educa-
tion than their seniors, and with different views on policing
methods. As police organizations are highly hierarchical
and rank-based, it is difficult for junior and newly recruited
personnel to bring forward new ideas, unless supported by
their leaders. As two young police officers explained:
We (junior officers) have a very different view. It was difficult
for us to take education on the side. Our senior leaders
said either you work or you take your education—we would
have to choose. They don’t understand the benefits from it
(education). I think in 5 to 10 years, things will be different.
The old generation is still there today, we’ll have to wait until
they are gone.
However, the junior-senior gap may take other forms
as well. In a sensitization meeting in one village, a com-
munity representative spoke of how junior police officers
exhibited violent behaviour towards community members.
He suggested that junior officers should patrol along with
senior officers who are more experienced in relating to and
communicating with the community, to learn from them.
4.1. Closeness versus Distance—a Balancing Act
The two COP models are, at least on paper, aimed at bring-
ing the police and the public closer together. Achieving the
right degree of closeness versus distance to the population
is a balancing act: ‘There are endless stories about the
tension between this need for a close relationships to the
societal space which is the object of policing- and the need
for distance that shall ensure ‘discipline’, the ultimate orien-
tation of police work towards the supposed ends of the state’
([1], p. 23). During the colonial period in Kenya, the British
recruited to the police forces individuals from communities
seen as less hostile towards the regime; this recruitment
was highly ethnicized [4]. Moreover, ’(...) police officers were
not allowed to serve in their home areas. This only served
to cement the view of many people that the police was an
alien unit’ ([4], p. 591). There are still traces of this system in
the Kenyan police today. Police officers are deployed on a
rotation system, preferably changing duty station every five
years—one reason being to prevent them from becoming
too embedded in local communities. The rotation system
can be seen as a way of trying to ensure impartiality and
neutrality among deployed police officers. However, tribalism
is a central element in the social and political construction
of Kenyan communities, and tribe and politics are closely
interconnected. In the rural villages visited in Kisumu and
Siaya counties, most police officers did not belong to the
same tribe as the majority of the local population. In such
cases, tribalism and political tensions between tribes can
fuel community reluctance to trust the police and cooperate
with them. In that sense, the police rotation deployment
system may stand in the way of COP initiatives encouraging
partnerships and collaboration. The rotation system also
represents an opportunity for political leaders to govern and
control areas of opposing tribes, political parties, views and
alliances, and to steer elections [60]. In addition, all police
officers are not necessarily interested in getting to know a
new area where they are only to spend a few years. A senior
police officer in one rural village also pointed out that it takes
time to get to understand a new local context.
Lastly, low police salaries impede the building of police-
public trust. In fact, the Ransley Report recommended
higher salaries and a greater police management focus
on salaries [37]. Many police officers must depend on
bribes to provide for their families and make ends meet.
Low payment increases police vulnerability to corruption
and makes officers susceptible to manipulations by more
powerful segments of the society. One police interviewee
conducting trainings on COP found it difficult to encourage
police officers to engage with local communities:
A challenge is that the police don’t want to connect with the
communities, because then it is harder to get bribes. It is
harder to ask for money, bribes and harass someone you
know and have a relationship with.
Hence, local police officers see models aimed at build-
ing stronger police-public relationships as economically
counter-productive. Mark Leting touches on this aspect in
his study of the NK in Kenya:
Police who are poorly paid and have low morale as a result
of serious management problems and corruption are not
likely to be motivated to cooperate with the community
and there may be a general lack of respect for community
policing strategy ([61], p. 32)
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Malpractice in the police in Kenya, such as corruption,
lack of accountability, poor leadership and use of violent and
undemocratic methods, collectively constitutes an institu-
tional problem. Deniz Kocak argues that basic bureaucratic
police professionalism and capacities are necessary condi-
tions to establish community policing ([62], p. 2). Maurice
Punch applies the metaphors of ‘rotten apples’, ‘rotten bar-
rels’ and ‘rotten orchards’ to police institutions [63], nothing
that the police themselves often employ the ‘rotten apple’
metaphor for a ‘deviant cop who slips into bad ways and
contaminates the other essentially good officers—which is
an individualistic, human failure model of deviance’ ([63],
p. 173). In a ‘rotten barrel’, the deviance spreads to a cer-
tain unit or segment of the police. A solution to rotten apples
and barrels is to remove and replace them. With ‘rotten
orchards’, however, malpractice has become systemic, per-
haps even encouraged or protected by certain elements in
the system: ‘at certain times and in certain contexts, police
deviance becomes virtually institutionalized, is affected by
and affects other parts of the criminal justice system, may
be related to wider influences in the broader enviroment and
leads to what I call “system failure”’ ([63], p. 172). Plagued
by endemic corruption, structural and management chal-
lenges, the police institution in Kenya may be characterized
as such a ‘system failure’. That does not mean that all police
officers are ‘bad’—on the contrary, some civilian intervie-
wees said that they do trust and cooperate with certain local
police officers. The challenge can rather be seen as the
system which facilitates, encourages, protects and rewards
certain deviant behaviours and practices.
This problem concerns not only the police, but the jus-
tice system as a whole. Several interviewees, both civilian
and police, emphasized that the justice and court system
is seen as weak and corrupt. In turn, low confidence in
the justice system and rule of law contributes to reluc-
tance to report cases to the police or share information
with them in the first place. As a result, the police have
a hard time performing their duties, for example getting
witnesses to testify in court. One CBO representative ex-
plained that sometimes local police officers even deem the
justice system so corrupt and insufficient that they decide
to take justice into their own hands. Punch argues that
to be able to explain how system failures occur and are
maintained, a range of mechanisms within the organization
as well as its wider environment must be taken into account.
In an organization designed to uphold the law, the law
can be broken because control, supervision, checks and
balances, monitoring, audits and leadership may all fail to
function adequately while cultural and institutional pres-
sures promote and support deviance (. . . ). This requires
our explanations to be posited on an analysis that ties
individual and group behavior to complex, causal strands
of formal and informal mechanisms of social interaction
within the organization and with the external environment
([63], p. 174).
As noted, the challenges of implementing COP are
closely connected to the wider socio-economic and political
context. For instance, that civilians as well as police officers
may use the COP models for their own or tribal gain, and
that political tensions stand in the way. Tribalism, nepotism
and corruption are not specific to COP initiatives, but em-
bedded in the overall social, political, economic structures
at the local and national levels. The police represent only
one piece in a larger political game for power and resources,
so police reform or community policing models alone can-
not to be expected to challenge or change such dynamics
and systems. Reform must be a part of a larger state build-
ing process involving wider public and political reforms and
developments.
5. Whose Police?
Finally, perhaps the most significant challenge to proper
implementation of the two COP models, concerns the man-
date of the police in Kenya and the role they are set to fulfil
in society. The main police ‘clientele’ steers how policing
is carried out. As Jackson and colleagues emphasize, the
degree of trust in the police hinges not only on the effec-
tiveness and competence of the police, but also involves
aspects such as police commitment, the extent of which the
police care about the people they serve, and their capacity
to understand the needs of the community and are willing to
address these needs ([33], p. 66). Research on procedural
justice shows that how citizens assess the fairness of the
police and justice system is highly dependent on how the
police interact with the population and how police officers
execute their power [64]. In turn, the way police officers
behave and view the public can be understood in light of two
different ‘police paradigms’ of the function and role of the
police, especially to whom the police are held accountable
[65]. On the one hand, the main mandate of the police may
be to protect the state: as a result, members of the public
are often excluded from partnerships [65]. This may also
be an ideological cover for more repressive functions of
social control [66]. In the second paradigm, the main task
of the police is defined as being to protect and serve the
public ([65], pp. 78–79). In practice, there is not necessarily
a strict division between the two paradigms ([65], p. 79)
and police systems encompass both functions to varying
degrees [2,67]. This difference between the two functions
is reflected in how policing is carried out ([65], p. 79). To
return to the case of Kenya, one police officer interviewed
said that some of his police colleagues ‘have a superiority
complex. They do not engage or mingle with civilians. The
communities feel they are looked down upon.’ One reason
for this behaviour, he argued, was the focus on ‘tackling
the enemy’ which is taught during police training. Some
community members interviewed for this study confirmed
this view: they feel that the police regard them as ene-
mies and treat them as such. Such police behaviours and
the role the police are trained to perform indicate a heavy
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state-protection mandate, with less emphasis on providing
a service to the public. Grasping the role and function of the
police today also requires understanding the social and po-
litical responsibilities of the police in their various historical
manifestations ([65], p. 78). As noted, the police institu-
tion in Kenya has its origins in the colonial period, where
the police were to protect the powerholders from rebellion
against the regime. The current police reform, endorsing
a people-centred police, represent a push for a paradigm
shift from this traditional system. Such transitions require
political will.
Alice Hills argues that the police in many African coun-
tries are in fact accountable solely to their presidents ([68],
p. 403); further, that police commissioners in these coun-
tries are the president’s point of access to the police institu-
tion ([68], p. 407). Citing examples from several presidents
in Africa, including Kenya’s former President Kibaki, she
hold that presidents do not want a police answerable to par-
liamentary committees or judicial enquiries: they ‘value the
police as a tool for enforcing political decisions, maintaining
order, regulating activities and regime representation’ ([68],
p. 407). In such contexts, Hills argues, security sector re-
form is unrealistic, as state leaders have little to gain from
democratizing the police: on the contrary, that would reduce
their personal power ([68], p. 406). Hence, proper imple-
mentation of police reforms and changes in police practices
relies on whether the president or other powerholders can
benefit from it or not.
The stated intention behind the Kenyan police reform
and the two COP models—to transform the police in-
stitution into a people-centred police with greater public
accountability—may not serve the interests of the presi-
dent, or other powerholders. On the other hand, closer
police-public coordination for gathering information may
yield valuable intelligence that can protect the regime. This
is in line with what many interviewees for this study have
said: that COP is just another platform for powerholders
to collect intelligence and conduct surveillance of the pop-
ulation, in order to maintain or increase their power. For
many Kenyans, the main pillars of the NPS COP—problem-
solving, partnership and police transformation—are simply
words on paper. As long as the main function of the police
is to protect the regime from its own citizenry, political and
economic interests will continue to steer the police reform
and the two COP models. As Tyler has put it, ‘Consequently,
legitimacy is the most promising framework for discussing
changing the goals of policing and moving from a police
force model to a police service model’ ([69], p. 29). As long
as tribal politics (including the president’s personal power)
and the police are two sides of the same coin, transforming
the Kenyan police into a legitimate, democratic and people-
centred police service seems unlikely. As Kocak points out,
policing cannot be separated from its political context, and
in order to promote and establish a community-oriented
approach to policing that is in line with good governance,
a transformative context of democratization is necessary
([62], p. 35). He adds that the necessary conditions for
establishing community policing are ‘a police organization
with, at least, basic professional bureaucratic capacities,
a genuine commitment and political will on behalf of local
authorities to promote and push for its implementation, and
a concept or approach to community policing that actually
matters to the respective local context and its realities’ ([62],
p. 35). These conditions are not yet in place in Kenya.
6. Conclusions
On paper, the police reform underway in Kenya represents a
paradigm shift towards a people-centred police. Enhancing
police-public relations and trust are at the core of the reform.
Two community policing (COP) models, the National Police
Service’s Community Policing Structure and the President’s
Office’ Nyumba Kumi (NK) model, have been developed
in order to bridge the gap between the police and local
communities. The NK model involves anchoring commu-
nity policing at the household level in clusters, in order to
improve relations and communications among community
members themselves as well as with the police. The NPS
model is structured through Community Policing Commit-
tees (CPC), consisting of members representing different
segments of the community and local police. In their meet-
ings, CPC members are, collectively, to identify and solve
problems at the community level, and coordinate activities,
programmes and trainings to promote security.
In practice, however, proper implementation of NK and
the CPCs has proven difficult. Observations and interviews
in local communities in urban and rural parts in Western,
Mid- and Eastern Kenya between 2016 and 2018, with
community organizations, community representatives and
police officers, show considerable scepticism towards the
two COP models. This article has identified and analysed
some main reasons why so many people are reluctant to en-
gage in COP, in order to explain the failure of the two COP
initiatives to improve police-public trust and cooperation.
Firstly, in the communities visited, the two initiatives had
not been properly anchored at the local level among com-
munity members, their leaders and the police. As a result,
confusion and misunderstandings arose, as to the set-up,
goal and purpose of the two COP structures. Moreover,
local communities saw the models as top-down approaches
imposed on them from above—not as initiatives driven and
organized by the communities themselves, which would
have given the communities greater agency and ownership
in the processes. As a result of uncertainties regarding the
policies and guidelines for implementation, as well as the
lack of oversight and accountability mechanism, civilians
and police COP members have in some cases misused the
two structures for personal gain and/or to accumulate and
secure power.
Secondly, police-public trust and implementation of the
COP models have been impeded by in-house problems
within the police system, such as lack of human and eco-
nomic resources, poor working conditions, training, manage-
ment and leadership at various levels in the police. More-
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over, the police reform, including people-centred policing
and COP policies, has not been translated into everyday
police practices on the ground nor properly integrated into
the police training and curriculum.
That is connected to the third point: the role and func-
tion of the police, and the question of who the police are
to serve. Ever since Kenya’s colonial period, the mandate
of the police has predominantly been to serve and pro-
tect the powerholders. Also today, politics and the police
are two sides of the same coin; the president and other
political figures have great personal power, also over the
police. Powerholders have little to gain if the police forces
are transformed into a truly people-centred, democratic and
accountable system. In fact, the two COP models represent
a way for powerholders to monitor and maintain surveillance
of local communities as a strategy for securing the regime
and their own personal power.
Interviewees reiterated the common perception in the ar-
eas visited: COP merely represents a method for the state
to ‘spy’ on its population. Without political will and power
to ensure proper implementation, the policies will remain
merely words on paper. Moreover, societal dynamics such
as tribalism, nepotism and corruption lie at the root of many
political, economic and social processes in Kenya, influenc-
ing rule of law and the justice system as a whole. Police
reform and community policing models alone can hardly
be expected to challenge this. What is needed is a wider
state-building process with deep-going public and political
reforms, developments and democratization. As of now, the
basic conditions for implementation of the two COP models
for the benefit of the general population in Kenya are simply
not there. People-centric policing and greater police-public
trust remain a long-term vision rather than a realistic goal
for the coming years. For the police in Kenya to become the
‘people’s police’, the road is indeed long and bumpy, with
many hazards and detours ahead.
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